Notes on: "The Balkans: A Short History" by Mark Mazower (e-Book, 2007, Random House)
Ch 1: "The Land and Its Inhabitants (pg 29)
Views of the region in the modern, post-imperial West were colored by Western European Christian (and, mainly, Roman Catholic) associations with the ancient Persians, inhabitants of the Levant (Palestinians, Arabs, Hebrews, etc...), "the Orient" (vs. "the Occident"), Muslims (after the first Jihad of the 7th-8th Centuries AD), Byzantium and the Eastern Orthodox Church, and, finally, Ottoman Turkey from 1453 through WWI.
From the previous article, each of these cultures, religions and polities held sway at differing times throughout the Balkans. The region is currently a rich, interwoven quilt-work of both Eastern and Western ethnicities, Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant religions -- all bound together in a varying map of the countries that we know of today.
One amazing historical fact, to me, was the apparent relative peace and continuity that existed within Communist Yugoslavia after WWII under Josip Broz Tito -- this given the great ethnic and religious conflagration that enveloped the country following his death in 1980 through as late as 2000.
"Turkey in Europe" The growth of the Ottoman Empire from 1300 through its height in 1683-1689:
With the great religious, ethnic and cultural diversity that existed in the area even before the coming of the Muslim Ottomans starting in the 14th century (a full 700 years after the immediate expansion after the death of Muhammad in 632 (during the Rashidun Caliphate (632-661))), it was maybe only the tolerance (yes, tolerance) of the Muslim Ottoman Empire that enabled peace and cohesion in the Balkans -- where the subjugated lands (as I recall, particularly in the Balkans) were treated more as a Western trophy/buffer to the great European powers of Central Europe AND, more importantly, a lucrative source of revenue for the Empire -- at a time when its other holdings in the east, the Levant, and North Africa were either becoming less lucrative -- or even more of a drain. As a result, the Ottomans were less interested in religious conversion (though at least nominal conversion to Islam DID confer economic and political benefits to those who did -- concessions to locals that actually worked AGAINST the Empire's primary interests -- tax revenue -- amongst its occupied Balkan subjects) and had an official policy of tolerance for other religions.
(Mazower p 40)The Ottoman occupation of these lands produced a fundamentally different social and political structure (from that in Western- or Northern Europe) as the populace transitioned from the age of ancient empires, through the peasant serfdom of the so-called Middle Ages, and into modern 19th and 20th century "modernity" and money-based economy. For the peasants in the area, the coming of the Ottomans (fall of Constantinople in 1453, and subsequent growth) may have been beneficial. Conditions under Christian Byzantium were primitive, and social relations were feudal -- with peasants in a state of serfdom. They had suffered from the political instability of the last 200 years of the decline of the late Byzantine period (~1250-1450) and the infighting amongst their lords and masters. The coming of the Ottomans established better order, removed the old feudal lords, and enabled an improved (though not absolute) freedom of the peasants not experienced elsewhere in Christian Europe (Catholic & Protestant Northern & Western Europe, or Orthodox Russia). On independence at the fall of the Ottoman Empire, this relative freedom and absence of landed aristocracy produced a fundamentally different social structure in this area as opposed to that in other areas of Europe.
As Mazower notes, the Ottoman Empire inherited a good system of roads in the area from its ancient Roman heritage with the Ottoman expansion into the Balkans beginning with the subjugation of the Second Bulgarian Empire (1185-1396 (or 1422) (fall of capital Tarnovgrad in 1393, & northwest remnants of state in 1396 at Battle of Nicopolis)) and later expansions. However, with the difficult, mountainous geography and rivers unusable for transport, the same factors that prevented a broad, cohesive local culture from forming made it difficult for effective management of an empire. Until the rise of rail transport, the roads were a critical piece of infrastructure -- but were left in a relative state of disrepair both by the Empire (in-part to minimize uprisings of the subjugated populace), and by the people due to their state of subjugation, relatively less developed social & economic structure & wealth -- and that it was more difficult for the Empire to collect taxes and otherwise project its authority through force. This all, in-turn, resulted in a largely rural, fragmented populace up to the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century -- and even into the 20th Century.
Refs:
Wikipedia "Bulgarian Empire" and Wikipedia "Ottoman Wars in Europe"
Decline of the Ottoman Empire from its height in 1689 through post-WWI and the fall of the Sultanate in 1922:
(Mazower p 47) Ottoman occupation policies favored the accumulation of Muslims into the towns of the region, and facilitated the establishment of a preferred Muslim elite (either by resettlement, or conversion (whether nominal or genuine) -- while the majority of the populace (80%) remained Christian -- but were largely peasants.
The character of the growth of urban commercialism (and a money-based economy with the rise of a capitalist system) was fundamentally different in Ottoman-controlled centers vs. the smaller, more "modern" Western mercantile centers of, say, Venice, or the Dutch. During the height of the Ottoman empire, elite positions were held by Muslims and, maybe, Jews. As the empire declined, this began to shift to include Christians. Regardless, accumulation of capital and wealth was severely restricted by Ottoman law -- so those operating in Ottoman lands usually had affiliates in Western areas such as Venice, Vienna, Prague, etc...
(Mazower 52)The rise of "nationalism" and "The Balkanization" of the Balkans in the late-19th and early 20th centuries must be considered in the light of the dramatic and relatively rapid wholesale shift in social-, political-, and economic relations of the populace from a peasant-based imperial structure based on in-kind taxation and dues, to one based on land ownership and monetization of farming. The development of nationalism as a mass movement was based not so much on allegiance to an abstract political construct of affiliation with ones "nation," but more concrete, immediate concerns such as "...right to land, livelihood and fair taxes." Incipient uprisings had more to do with protests against over-taxation during poor harvests, and mal-treatment by soldiers accompanying tax collectors.
For example, after the pullback of the Ottomans, observers noted the great increase in order, prosperity and industry released in the newly independent populace -- with the release of industry amongst the newly independent peasantry.
